Epistemological Argument (Can Logic Exist In A Naturalistic Universe?)

Before I begin, I see many people stumbling upon this thread by typing in “can logic exist in another universe”, or something of the like, into the search bar. The thing is though, we depend upon our present logic to even do such thought experiments. The only possible conclusion then would be to say that in some universes, being illogical (to us) is logical. This doesn’t tell us anything though. It only assumes that what is illogical to us presently, in some way shape or form, can be logical in another universe. However, has anyone been to that universe and checked it out? Even if they did, they would still depend upon their present logic and wouldn’t be able to tell if there was another logic! Interesting then how they can be so sure that it is possible.

If what is illogical according to our present logic were able to be logical in another universe, that would be somewhat like recording sounds of nature, such as waterfalls, rocks falling, etc, and trying to interpret what they are saying.

To say another logic can exist alludes to the notion that our present logic can’t be trusted. If logic can be a free for all, then we have no bases for assuming that an apple is an apple, that an apple is not also an elephant, and that anything that is not an apple can’t be what an apple is. Someone might be in another universe using our same laws of logic and arguing that logic can be different in OUR universe. But can it really? How can we even trust our present laws of logic if they are subject to change in other universes? Why couldn’t they change in this one then? And therefore, on what bases would we claim to know anything?

Now to my post…

Moral relativism is an oxymoron

It is impossible to state that something doesn’t exist, when that something only exists by being the opposite of the definition stating it doesn’t exist. Saying that morality is relative is saying that no morality exists. But morality can only exist, by definition, by not being relative.

Therefore, we must assume to know what morality is, namely, a standard void of relativity, before we can make a claim about it, which is that it is relative. But how can we make a claim about something that only exists by being the opposite of the claim made about it? This reduces to a category error. If I say the white wall is black, then the wall I’m describing is agreed to not be black before I describe it to be black. So it is with the claim “morality is relative”.